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Context 
 
 The decision of Lai v Soineva [2011] QSC 247 in relation to the 
operation of standard conditions in the Queensland REIQ contract 
highlights a very practical issue often overlooked in the heat of a 
transaction .The point is relatively simple. In this instance, the case 
concerned the interpretation of the printed "Building and Pest 
Inspection Clause"  but is of relevance to the printed "Finance Clause" 
in the same contract as the wording and principles are identical. It 
highlights the issue of knowing well what is in the standard contract 
and not making assumptions. The case also highlights the cost to a 
party of dithering in making an election in a time of the essence 
environment 
 
 Facts 
 
 A standard REIQ contract was signed subject to the buyers being 
entitled to carry out a building and pest inspection, the contract in 
particular being "subject to the buyers obtaining a written building 
report from a building inspector .... by a specified date" (28 June at 
5.00pm).The buyers then had a number of options  in Clause 4.2 
which required the giving of notice to the seller that 
1. that a satisfactory report had not been obtained by the specified 
date and to terminate the contract OR 
2. that a satisfactory report had been obtained (and the contract 
remained on foot) OR 
3. that the buyer waived the benefit of the clause (and the contract 
remained on foot) 
  
On 21 June the buyers advised the sellers that the buyers were not 
satisfied with the building inspection report. Then followed an advice  
in the same communication that "at completion a cheque for $4.500 
would be handed over to a pest management  company". On 28 June 
at 4.48pm,the sellers sent a reply to the buyer indicating that the 
sellers did not agree to a cheque for $4,500 being handed over at 
completion. On 29 June, the agent transferred the sum of $4.500 to 
the buyers’ solicitor's trust account to be held in trust pending 
settlement. On the same day, the buyers sent a fax to the sellers saying 
that they "were satisfied with the Building and Pest Condition under 
the Contract" On 30 June, the sellers terminated the contract and 
asked the stakeholder to refund the deposit to the buyers. 
The buyers opposed this action alleging that the contract was still on 
foot. 
  
Analysis 
 
Whilst the standard Clause 4.2 does not provide a time in which 
notice should be given it, nevertheless, provided the buyers with the 
three discrete options, terminate, advise satisfaction or waive the 
benefit of the clause .In the latter two instances ,the contract would 
proceed. By Clause 4.4, after that specified date (28 June) had passed 
and the buyers had not advised satisfaction with the report nor waived 
the benefit of the clause, the sellers had the option of terminating. The 
buyers claimed that the buyers could give notice after "5.00pm of 28 
June to the effect that it was satisfied with the report ,if done before 
the sellers had terminated. Dalton J held, upon a construction of the 
clause, that after 5.00pm on 28 June, the buyers did not have the right 
to give notice either in respect of the condition being satisfied or that 
it had been waived. 
The buyers then argued that the fax of 29 June should be taken as 
amounting to a waiver of the condition. For two reasons, Dalton J 
found this not to be the case, firstly upon a construction of the 
communication itself (which could not be said unequivocally to be a 
waiver) and secondly, that at 29 June, the buyers could only terminate 
.The sellers’ termination was thus held to be valid. 
 
 Conclusions. 
 
 The buyers in this case made two errors. Firstly, they wrote a letter 
regarding the deduction from the settlement money of a payment to 
the pest management company when this had not been agreed 
between the parties which communication indicated also that the 
buyers were not satisfied with the Report. Secondly, the buyers  
changed their minds about the Report  and waited one day after they 
should have done ,where time was of the essence of the contract, to 
then advise satisfaction with the condition, something which should 
have been done before 5.00pm on 28 June. After that time, by Clause 
4.4, the seller had an express right to terminate and the only 
continuing right of the buyer was to terminate (should the seller not 
do so). 
This was a relatively clear case of the rights of the parties in a number 
of circumstances being explicit in the contract and the time of 
exercise being very strictly confined to certain times. It was clear 
from the express words of the contract that the buyer lost the right to 
waive or advise satisfaction beyond the date when the report was due. 
The case is a timely reminder for practitioners to familiarise 
themselves thoroughly with operation of these standard conditions 
which are often utilised, the subject to finance clause (Clause 3) being 
framed in exactly the same manner. 
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